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Foundations of Religious Liberty: 
Toleration or Respect? 
BRIAN LEITER* 
* John P. Wilson Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law, 
Philosophy, and Human Values, University of Chicago. The paper owes its existence to
a presentation by Martha Nussbaum at the Law and Philosophy Workshop at the 
University of Chicago Law School in fall 2008, and to a question posed on that occasion 
by Jim Staihar, our Law and Philosophy Fellow at the law school during 2008–2009. 
My thinking about the issue was also aided by Simon Blackburn’s presentation of his 
views at a different session of the Workshop.  My thanks to them all and to the students 
and discussants, for the stimulus of their ideas.  The present version of the paper
benefitted from comments by audiences at the MacMillan Center Initiative on Religion,
Politics & Society at Yale University; the Law & Philosophy Workshop at the University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor; the conference on “Respect, Global Justice, and Human 
Rights” at the University of Pavia in Italy; a session of the Society for Applied
Philosophy at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association 
in New York; the Analytic Legal Philosophy conference at New York University; and
the University of San Diego School of Law conference on “Freedom of Conscience.”  I
should mention especially helpful suggestions or comments from Robert Audi, 
Emanuela Ceva, N.A.T. Coleman, David Enoch, Rainier Forst, Kent Greenawalt, Scott 
Hershovitz, Andrew Koppelman, Martha Nussbaum, Peter Railton, Samuel Rickless,
Connie Rosati, Scott Shapiro, Jeremy Waldron, and Michael White.  Finally, I should 
acknowledge the influence of Nietzsche on my thinking about these issues in two 
respects: first, in emphasizing that the falsity of a belief does not decide the question of 
its value, and second, in impressing upon me that the deleterious effects of religion
should not obscure its salutary ones—though Nietzsche had in mind different ones from 
those I emphasized. 
 935




    
   
 














    
  
    
 
  
   
  
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 936 
II.  RESPECT AND TOLERATION ................................................................................ 938 
III.  WHAT IS “RELIGION”? ....................................................................................... 944 
IV.  CAN WE RESPECT RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE? ...................................................... 951 
V. CONCLUDING (TENTATIVE) THOUGHTS .............................................................. 957 
I. INTRODUCTION
Most Western constitutions, including the American, single out
religious beliefs and practices for special kinds of legal solicitude and
protection.  In this essay, I want to ask a question about the moral
foundations of such a legal practice.  Should we think of what I will refer
to generically as “the law of religious liberty” as grounded in the moral 
attitude of respect for religion or on the moral attitude of tolerance of 
religion?1  My question will not be which of these moral ideals best 
explains the existing law of religious liberty in the United States, or 
elsewhere, though legal doctrine is a relevant data point for the inquiry.
Instead, I want to ask which of these moral attitudes makes the most
sense given what religion is.  Of course, our legal practices offer some
evidence about “what makes the most sense” because they are, quite 
obviously, not detached from our moral attitudes.2 But the law is but
one data point among others, and if it were to turn out that aspects of
existing legal doctrine in the United States should yield before the best 
account of the moral foundations of religious liberty that is a conclusion 
I am happy to endorse. 
I begin by explicating the relevant moral attitudes of “respect” and 
“toleration.”  With regard to the former, I start with a well-known
treatment of the idea of respect in the Anglophone literature by the moral 
1. The capacious “law of religious liberty” will thus encompass special legal
protections for religious practices, exemptions from generally applicable laws for some
religious practices, and limitations on state endorsements or “establishments” of religion 
and religious practices.  The moral argument for antiestablishment provisions may, of 
course, differ from that in support of “free exercise” provisions. 
2. Laws are some evidence of the moral sensibilities of individuals, and because
moral attitudes are nothing more than certain kinds of psychosocial artifacts, the best we
can do in normative moral theory is consider various bits of evidence about what these
artifacts are and see if, and how, they hang together.  I will not defend this general meta-
ethical position here, though for some discussion, see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 203–55 (2007). 
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philosopher Stephen Darwall.3  With respect to the latter concept, toleration, 
I shall draw on my own earlier discussion,4 though now emphasizing the
features of toleration that set it apart from one kind of respect.  In
deciding whether respect or toleration can plausibly serve as the moral
foundation for the law of religious liberty, we will need to say something 
about the nature of religion.  American courts have dodged the question
of what “religion” is for obvious political reasons, but too many scholars 
have also fallen back on the Wittgensteinian habit of not even attempting
an analysis of religion on the grounds that it is a family resemblance 
concept.5  Perhaps that will prove the best that we can do, but we should
at least first try to do better before giving up.  I shall propose a fairly
precise analysis of what makes a belief and a concomitant set of practices
“religious,” again drawing on my earlier work.  That will then bring us 
to the central question: should our laws reflect “respect” for religion” or 
only “toleration”?  Martha Nussbaum has recently argued for “respect”
as the moral foundation of religious liberty, though, as I will suggest, her 
account is ambiguous between the two senses of respect that emerge from
Darwall’s work.6  In particular, I shall claim that in one sense of respect 
3. Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36 (1977) [hereinafter 
Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect].  Darwall has since revised his views. See, e.g., Stephen 
Darwall, Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, Address Before the Central 
Division of the American Philosophical Association (Apr. 24, 2004), in  PROC. &
ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N, Nov. 2004, at 43, 43–59.  Because I find the metaphysics 
of second-person reasons a bit mysterious, I am going to concentrate on the earlier
version of Darwall’s view, which at least makes a certain intuitive sense.
 4. Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008). 
5. Wittgenstein’s paradigm example was that of “games,” though a Canadian
philosopher, Bernard Suits, has offered an extremely clever analysis even of “games,” 
one which is a considerable advance over the empty gesturing at “family resemblance.” 
See  BERNARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE AND UTOPIA (1978).  Here is the 
crux of the analysis: 
[T]o play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing about a 
specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by rules 
[lusory means], where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means [constitutive rules], and where such rules are accepted just
because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude].
Id. at 34.  The point in the text is not that Wittgenstein is always wrong—to the contrary. 
But we are not entitled to conclude there is no analysis available until we try to produce 
one. 
 6. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008).  Nussbaum’s framework is an essentially
Rawlsian one, so “equal respect for conscience” is supposed to be embodied in the basic 
structure of society, not necessarily in interpersonal relations.  I am not sure that point 
affects the analysis that follows.
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(hereafter “minimal” respect), it is compatible with nothing more than
toleration of religion, and that in a different sense (hereafter “affirmative” 
respect, which Nussbaum appears to want to invoke), it could not form
the moral basis of a legal regime because religion is not the kind of
belief system that could warrant that attitude. 
II. RESPECT AND TOLERATION
“I really respect her intellect” and “You should show some respect for 
his feelings” both employ the same word, but express two different
concepts of respect: the former I will call the “affirmative” concept of 
respect, the latter the “minimal” concept.  Nussbaum has defended an 
account of the moral foundations of the law of religious liberty as based
on a principle of “equal respect for conscience,”7 which she takes to be
different from “mere” toleration of religion.8  I shall argue that the minimal 
concept of respect does not, at least with regard to religion, move us far 
beyond the moral ideal of toleration and that only if religion warrants the 
“affirmative” concept of respect would we have reason to think our law 
of religious liberty should answer to a more demanding moral standard.9 
In the section of the paper that follows, I argue that there is no case for
application of the “affirmative” concept. 
The minimal concept of respect—as expressed in “You should show
some respect for his feelings”—maps on to what Darwall dubbed many
years ago “Recognition Respect.”  This kind of respect, in Darwall’s 
formulations, involves “giving appropriate consideration or recognition 
to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do,”10 for
example, “by being willing to constrain one’s behavior in ways required 
by” those features.11  In short, “[r]ecognition respect for persons . . . is
identical with recognition respect for the moral requirements that are 
placed on one by the existence of other persons.”12 
Darwall’s Recognition Respect is a minimal form of respect in two 
regards: first, it is agnostic about any other dimension of value that 
might attach to the particular manifestations of the features of the object
7. Id. at 332. 
8. Id. at 24. 
9. Is there some middle conceptual ground between the two?  Perhaps, as 
Benjamin Whiting has impressed upon me, it is something like what Leslie Green calls
“understanding.”  Leslie Green, On Being Tolerated, in  THE LEGACY OF H.L.A. HART
277, 291–96 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 2008).  How such an attitude could be 
made concrete in a legal regime is unclear, as Whiting has argued in unpublished work. 
 10. Darwall, supra note 3, at 38.
11. Id. at 45. 
12. Id.
938
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to which the respect is owed; and second, it is silent on the nature of the 
“moral” constraints on behavior that are demanded by the respect.  The 
first kind of minimalness is central to demarcating Darwall’s Recognition 
Respect from its more affirmative cousin, what Darwall calls “Appraisal
Respect”—about which more momentarily.  The second kind of
minimalness is what makes it hard to distinguish Recognition Respect 
from toleration, as I shall argue below. 
If the claim that “[y]ou should show some respect for his feelings” 
invokes the minimal concept of respect, the statement, “I really respect 
her intellect” depends on a more affirmative concept, what Darwall dubs
Appraisal Respect.  In Darwall’s terminology, “[s]uch respect . . . consists
in an attitude of positive appraisal of that person either as a person or as 
engaged in some particular pursuit”;13 as a result it “is like esteem or a
high regard for someone,” and it is compatible with having no “particular
conception of just what behavior from oneself would be required or 
made appropriate by that person’s having the features meriting such
respect.”14  When you “respect her intellect,” you admire and appraise 
highly the caliber of her mind, whereas when you “respect his feelings,” 
you act in such a way as to show an appropriate moral regard for how 
your actions might affect them. 
Notice, again, that the minimal concept of respect—Darwall’s
Recognition Respect—makes no substantive moral demand on the kind
of action that is appropriate: it requires only that one honor whatever 
“moral requirements . . . are placed on one by the existence of other
persons.”15  The substantive content of these moral requirements is open; 
indeed, it seems that Recognition Respect is morally otiose: “only an 
exhortation to perform the (other) duties that we already owe,” as Leslie 
Green puts it.16 
Yet Appraisal Respect also makes no substantive moral demand on
action but for a different reason: it demands only “esteem” or high 
appraisal of certain features of persons, not that one act towards them in
a certain way.  Yet Appraisal Respect can also result in moral demands
13. Id. at 38. 
14. Id. at 39.  Darwall introduces a further, obviously Kantian element to the 
account according to which “the excellences must be thought to depend in some way or 
other on features of character.” Id. at 42. 
15. Id. at 45. 
 16. Leslie Green, Two Worries About Respect for Persons, 120 ETHICS 212, 213
(2010). 
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on action when the highly appraised features are ones with moral value 
or that one has a moral obligation to support or protect.  One ought to
“respect” genius, and the more genius there is in the world, the greater
the well-being of persons, or so one might think.  So a certain kind of 
consequentialist might think that Appraisal Respect for someone’s genius 
generates prima facie obligations towards that person. 
Toleration as a moral attitude operates somewhat differently, and we 
need to start, again, by distinguishing it from superficially similar 
attitudes.  The key to the attitude of toleration is disapproval of another 
group’s belief or practice, yet “putting up” with that belief or practice 
nonetheless.17  Thus, in the first instance, toleration is not at issue in 
cases where one group is simply indifferent to another.  I do not “tolerate”
my neighbors who are nonwhite or who are gay because I am indifferent
as to the race or sexual orientation of those in my community.  Toleration, 
as an ideal, can only matter when one group actively concerns itself with 
what the other is doing, believing, or “being.”  Obviously, in many cases,
the attitude of “indifference” is actually morally preferable to that of
toleration: better that people should be indifferent as to their neighbors’
sexual orientation than that they should disapprove of it, but “tolerate” it 
nonetheless. 
Many practices, however, that seem to mimic toleration are not grounded 
in the view that there are moral reasons to tolerate differing points of 
view and practices, that permitting such views and practices to flourishes 
is itself a kind of good or moral right, notwithstanding our disapproval. 
Much that has the appearance of principled toleration is nothing more
than pragmatic or, we might say, “Hobbesian” compromise: one group 
would gladly stamp out the others’ beliefs and practices but has reconciled 
itself to the practical reality that they cannot get away with it, at least not 
without the intolerable cost of the proverbial “war of all against all.”  To 
an outsider, this may look like toleration—one group seems to “put up”
with the other—but it does not embody what I will refer to as “principled”
17. I take the claim in the text to mark the core case of toleration, though there are
ordinary usages of the term that are a bit different.  For example, strong dislike need not 
be the same as disapproval: some people strongly dislike the smell of some French 
cheeses (though it would be odd to say they disapprove of the cheese!), but they will 
tolerate others consuming them.  It is not that they disapprove of the smell, they just 
really do not like it, but the fact that they “put up with it” might count as toleration.  Or a 
different case: my neighbors have built a fence that encroaches a bit across the property
line.  I could ask them to remove the fence but think it not worth the bother: I would
rather just tolerate the encroachment.  I am inclined to think that the sense of toleration 
emphasized in the text is the one that matters especially in the case of religion.  Thanks
to Robert Audi and Peter Railton for helpful thoughts on this topic. 
940
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toleration because the reasons for putting up are purely instrumental and 
egoistic, according no weight to moral considerations. One group “puts
up” with the other only because it would not be in that group’s interest to
incur the costs required to eradicate the other group’s beliefs and practices. 
It is not only Hobbesians who mimic commitment to a principle of
toleration.  On one reading of Locke, his central nonsectarian argument
for religious toleration is that the coercive mechanisms of the state are
ill-suited to effect a real change in belief about religious or other matters.18 
Genuine beliefs, sincerely held, cannot be inculcated at gunpoint, as it 
were, because they respond to evidence and norms of rational justification, 
not threats.19 In consequence, says the Lockean, we better get used to 
toleration in practice—not because there is some principled or moral
reason to permit the heretics to flourish but because the state lacks the
right tools to cure them of their heresy, to inculcate in them the so-called
correct beliefs. 
Locke, it is fair to say, did not fully appreciate the extent to which 
states and—in capitalist societies—private entities can employ sophisticated 
means to effectively coerce belief, means that are both more subtle and 
more effective than he imagined.  That history offers up so many
examples of societies in which the tyranny of the few over the many is 
accepted by the many as a quite desirable state of affairs is compelling 
evidence that states can successfully inculcate beliefs, even dangerously 
false beliefs.  Locke’s “instrumental” argument for a practice of toleration 
should provide little comfort to the defender of toleration given Locke’s 
(understandable) failure to appreciate the full complexity of the psychology
and sociology of belief inculcation. 
Not only Hobbesians and Lockeans, however, mimic principled
toleration.  A variation on the Lockean instrumental argument for toleration 
is apparent in a popular theme in American political thinking—one that 
receives a well-known articulation in Frederick Schauer’s defense of
 18. Jeremy Waldron, Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution, in
JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 66–67 (Susan
Mendus ed., 1988). 
19. Locke puts a distinctively Protestant “spin” on this epistemological point 
because he believes that salvation can only come through a free, uncoerced embrace of 
religious doctrine.  On that Protestant view, there would be no point in nontoleration because 
it would not accomplish any meaningful religious objective given the prerequisites for
salvation.
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free speech20—according to which government cannot be trusted to 
discharge the task of intolerance “correctly,” that is, in the right instances. 
Speech can harm, in all kinds of ways, notes Schauer, and the various
rationales for putting up with these harms—from Mill’s “marketplace of 
ideas” to Meiklejohn’s conception of free speech as essential to democratic
self-government—almost all fall prey to objections of one kind or 
another.  But, says Schauer, there is still a reason to demand that the 
state “tolerate” many different kinds of speech—even harmful speech— 
and that is because there is no reason to think the state will make the 
right choices about which speech ought to be regulated.  Schauer calls 
this “the argument from governmental incompetence”21 and says, 
Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability of government to
make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of
truth and falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a
somewhat deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general sense.22 
It is not, then, as in the Lockean argument, that government lacks the
right means for bringing about intolerant ends; it is rather that government 
is not competent, that is, cannot be relied upon, to deploy its means in
the right cases.  Perhaps this kind of instrumental argument for state
toleration is more plausible, but its justificatory structure makes it no 
different from that of the Lockean’s: it does not tell us why we, morally, 
ought not to crush differing beliefs or practices; it tells us only that we, 
through the instrumentality of the state, are unlikely to do it right. 
Where a genuine “principle of toleration” gets its purchase is in the 
cases where one group—the “dominant” group—actively disapproves of 
what another group—the “disfavored” group—believes or does; where 
that dominant group has the means at its disposal to effectively and reliably
change or end the disfavored group’s beliefs or practices; and yet still
the dominant group acknowledges that there are moral or epistemic
reasons—reasons pertaining to knowledge or truth—to permit the
disfavored group to keep on believing and doing what it does.  That is 
moral or principled toleration, and it is this attitude I want to compare 
with one of respect.23 
20. See generally  FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982).  For similar considerations, see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70–86 
(David Spitz ed., 1975). 
 21. SCHAUER, supra note 20, at 86. 
22. Id.
23. “Pure” or “principled” because the reasons for toleration are not based on self-
interest, at least not directly.
942
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Recognition Respect demands only, to quote Darwall again, that one 
honor whatever “moral requirements . . . are placed on one by the existence 
of other persons.”24  But surely among the “moral requirements” one has to
abide by are those demanded by principled toleration.25  Has one discharged 
all one’s moral obligations of respect towards the religious beliefs and
practices of a person if one tolerates them?  Only an argument that morality 
demands more by way of our attitudes and practices towards religion 
would support a negative answer. 
Martha Nussbaum, in her recent lengthy defense of religious liberty— 
more precisely, liberty of conscience—thinks that “tolerance” of religion 
is “too grudging and weak” an attitude.26  We need, she thinks, a “special
respect for the faculty in human beings with which they search for life’s 
ultimate meaning,” namely, their “faculty” of conscience.27  We should 
follow Roger Williams in “rever[ing] . . . the sincere quest for meaning”28 
because “everyone has inside something infinitely precious, something 
that demands respect from us all, and something in regard to which we 
are all basically equal.”29  But how can we distinguish respect here from
toleration, the attitude Nussbaum deems “too grudging and weak”?  We
are all probably more or less equal in our capacity for self-deception, for 
example, but that demands nothing more than toleration: as long as your 
self-deception does not harm someone else, we ought to let it alone.  So,
too, it might seem with “conscience” and the “sincere quest for meaning”: 
that ought to be tolerated, even when your “sincere quest for meaning” 
leads you to feel disgust for homosexuality as violating the dignity of the 
family.30  Humans are roughly equal in many faculties, but it seems odd 
to think that deficient exercises of those faculties should elicit a moral
attitude beyond that of tolerance.31  That is the dilemma that afflicts
 24. Darwall, supra note 3, at 45.
25. This is the argument in Leiter, supra note 4, at 1.
 26. NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 24. 
27. Id. at 19. 
28. Id. at 52. 
29. Id.
30. Whether one can act on that attitude consistent with the Harm Principle is a
separate question. 
31. Hitler, let us remember, was a man of conscience too, so committed, on 
principle, to the extermination of European Jewry that even when it would have been 
prudent to use the Jews as slave labor to free up German manpower for the war, he 
persisted, to the bitter end, in exterminating them.  Does Hitler’s failed exercise of 
conscience warrant any respect?  It does not even warrant toleration! 
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something like Nussbaum’s view of liberty of conscience32: yes, the
faculty of conscience, which we all possess—however deficiently we
exercise it—might be thought to elicit a kind of minimal Recognition 
Respect from others.  But why is that minimal notion of respect not fully
discharged by the moral attitude of toleration? 
We cannot, however, address the question of what kind of respect
religious conscience warrants without addressing what religion is.  It is 
to this question we now turn. 
III. WHAT IS “RELIGION”?
I want to here revisit an account of religious belief and conscience 
developed in an earlier essay.33  That account drew on suggestive— 
though, I argued, ultimately incomplete—proposals in the work of the 
legal philosopher Timothy Macklem34 and the legal scholar John Witte 
Jr.35  Following their leads, I propose that two features single out 
“religious” states of mind from others.  The first pertains to the normativity
of (at least some) religious commands; the second pertains to the
relationship between religious belief and evidence.  On the proposed 
account, for all religions, there are at least some beliefs central to the 
religion that:
(1) issue in categorical demands on action, that is, demands that
must be satisfied, no matter what an individual’s antecedent 
desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the 
world offers up;36 and, 
32. It afflicts not only her view, of course: Nussbaum here follows Kant, and 
related rhetoric is embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Such rights 
undoubtedly maximize human well-being, but it is less clear whether the concept of
“respect” can be cogently motivated as their moral foundation.  As with Darwall’s 
Recognition Respect, talk of respect seems to be morally otiose. 
 33. Leiter, supra note 4. 
34. See generally TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND (2006). 
35. See generally JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 2005). 
36. The claim is not that all beliefs commonly denominated “religious” issue in 
such commands but that it is characteristic of religion that at least some of the commands
in which it issues are categorical in character.  It may be more accurate, though, to say
that religious belief issues in as-if categorical demands on action because it is familiar 
enough that religions can impose other worldly incentives to produce action in this world
that seems “as if” it were a response to a categorical reason, when it is really a response 
to an instrumental reason for achieving an other worldly objective.  As Adrienne Martin
aptly put it to me in correspondence: “[A]n instrumental reason motivates as strongly as
the incentive on which it is contingent,” and other worldly incentives can, of course, 
provide a very powerful instrumental reason!  Indeed, as I note later on, to the extent that 
a metaphysics of ultimate reality is also a distinguishing feature of religion, it may
944
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(2) do not answer ultimately—or at the limit—to evidence and 
reasons because evidence and reasons are understood in other 
domains concerned with knowledge of the world.  Religious
beliefs, in virtue of being based on “faith,” are insulated from 
ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the 
ones we employ in both common sense and in science.37 
I shall refer to this first feature as the categoricity of religious commands
and the second as religious belief’s insulation from evidence.38  Although I
will often use the language of “belief” in what follows, it would be more
accurate to say that what is really at issue here are the characteristic
epistemic and normative attitudes of religious believers: it is they who 
experience certain commands as categorical and they who hold at least
some of the religion’s beliefs regardless of the evidence.39 
The categoricity of religious commands accounts for both one of the
most admirable and one of the most frightening aspects of religious 
commitment, namely, the willingness of religiously motivated believers 
to act in accordance with religious precepts, notwithstanding the costs.
supply believers with instrumental reasons for acting insofar as acting in the right kinds 
of way enables believers to stand in the right kind of relationship to that ultimate reality.
37. Religious beliefs presumably do answer to evidence in instrumental contexts, 
that is, when there are questions about what means would be effective to the realization 
of the categorical commands of the religion.  So, too, one suspects that the interpretation 
of categorical commands is causally influenced by the experiences of the interpreters: so,
for example, “liberation theology” arose as a strand of Catholicism in the context of the 
horrific poverty and vicious oppression that characterized United States client states in 
Latin America after World War II.  But this phenomenon trades on an ambiguity
between “evidence” as justification for the proposition it supports and “evidence” as the 
experiences that explain why particular propositions are embraced.  An adequate
sociohistorical explanation of liberation theology must, of course, make reference to the
climate of social and economic oppression in which it arose, but the beliefs constitutive 
of that religious outlook were not, themselves, presented as justified by those experiences. 
Thanks to Sheila Sokolowski for raising this issue. 
 38. I treat beliefs as central to religion precisely because it is hard to see how 
mindless or habitual religious practices could claim whatever respect, affirmative or minimal,
is due matters of conscience.  It is because of the underlying beliefs that we think the
actions required by those beliefs deserve special moral and perhaps legal solicitude.  No
one thinks mindless or habitual behavior per se has a claim on special legal or moral
consideration.
39. There may, of course, be some matters that fall within the purview of religions,
for example, the “meaning of life,” that are insulated from evidence only in the sense that
no scientific evidence would seem to bear on them.  Such beliefs are not my concern
here, mainly because they are not distinctive to religion.  See the discussion, infra, 
regarding moral judgments for further elaboration.
 945




























        
      
      
  
  
    
Thus we find the devoutly religious among those who were at the forefront
of domestic resistance to Nazi oppression in the 1930s40 and the injustice 
of apartheid in South Africa from the 1960s onward and in America in 
the 1950s and 1960s.41  We also, of course, find the devoutly religious
among those who bomb abortion clinics and fly airplanes into buildings.
These religiously inspired individuals risk—and often suffer—death,
injury, and prison in order to comply with their religious conscience.  It
is painfully familiar, of course, that in all these cases adherents of the 
very same religion contested whether the actions of these believers were
sanctioned, let alone commanded, by the religious doctrine.42 The
important fact here, however, is that religious commands—whether rightly
or wrongly understood—are taken categorically by their adherents. 
Is religion really alone in this regard?  One respect in which Marxism
may have been rightly called a “religion” is precisely that in some of the 
historical contexts just noted, the only other groups as categorically
committed to resistance as the religiously inspired were communists,
who led resistance to Nazism, as well as apartheid in both South Africa
and the United States, long before other groups joined the battle.  More 
generally, of course, one might think that all commands of morality are
categorical in just this way.  Does that mean, then, that religion is not
special after all because it shares the property of categoricity of its 
commands with Marxism and with one common understanding of morality?
We can easily distinguish the case of moral commands.43  To be sure,
there are theoretical understandings of morality—Kant’s most famously, 
though not only his—according to which the demands of morality are
indeed categorical.  What is interesting and important about religion is
that it is one of the few systems of belief that gives effect to this 
categoricity.  Pure Kantian moral agents are few and far between (I think 
I can count them on one hand and probably have fingers left over!), but
those who genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity
of the moral demands they recognize are overwhelmingly religious. 
But not all of them are, of course, and this is where the case of Marxists
and other similar “believers” becomes relevant.  Here, though, we need
to attend to the second purportedly distinctive feature of religious belief, 
40. See, e.g., MARY ALICE GALLIN, GERMAN RESISTANCE TO . . . . HITLER: ETHICAL
AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS 165–97 (1961). 
41. See generally, e.g., DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC
RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 87–104 (2004); JOHN W. DE GRUCHY, THE
CHURCH STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA (2d ed. 1986). 
42. Religious leaders, to take but one example, were also at the forefront of
defense of apartheid in the United States in the 1950s and ‘60s. 
43. We shall, however, return to a further complication about the moral case below. 
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namely, its insulation from evidence and reasons. Whatever the historical
and philosophical verdict on the evidence and reasons supporting Marxism, 
one very clear difference is that Marxism took itself to be answering
to—not insulated from—standards of evidence and reasons in the sciences, 
in a way that religion has not.44  Marx, as is well-known, conceived of his
theory as a “scientific” account of historical change, and thus it had to 
answer to the same standards of evidence and justification as any other 
scientific theory.45  Nothing similar, of course, is true of any of the major
religious traditions: all countenance at least some central beliefs that are 
not ultimately answerable to evidence and reasons as these are understood 
elsewhere—in common sense and in science.  This is why Professor
Macklem was correct to emphasize that the distinctively religious state 
of mind is that of faith, that is, believing something notwithstanding the 
evidence and reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it. 
Even here, of course, we need to be careful.  There are, for example,
“intellectualist” traditions in religious thought—Paley’s “natural theology”
or neo-Thomist arguments come to mind—according to which religious
beliefs—belief in a Creator or, as in America recently, belief in “an
Intelligent Designer”—are, in fact, supported by the kinds of evidence 
adduced in the sciences, once that evidence is rightly interpreted.  It is
doubtful whether these intellectualist traditions capture the character of
popular religious belief, but even if they did, there remain important
senses in which they are still “insulated from evidence.” First, of course, 
it is dubious, to the put matter gently, that these positions are really
serious about following the evidence where it leads, as opposed to
manipulating it to fit preordained ends.  Second, and relatedly, in the 
case of the sciences, beliefs based on evidence are also revisable in light
of the evidence, but in the intellectualist traditions in religious thought 
just noted, there is no suggestion that the fundamental beliefs will be 
44. I think this is true notwithstanding the unhappy strand of Marxist thought that 
took seriously the Hegelian idea that “dialectical reason” was a special kind of reason, as 
opposed to a metaphysical dogma.  For even the idea of dialectical reason took seriously
the idea of evidence and rational justification, and in fact, Hegel’s entire philosophical 
career was an exercise in providing evidence for the purportedly dialectical structure of 
ideological, and thus historical, evolution. That the Hegelian influence on Marxism 
produced a false picture of evidence and reasons does not alter the fact that Marxism 
took itself to have an obligation to answer to standards of rational justification.
45. That is why it has been possible to refute historical materialism by counterexample. 
See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, 79 J. PHIL. 253, 
266–68 (1982) (book review). 
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revisable in light of new evidence.  Religious beliefs are purportedly
supported by evidence, but they are still insulated from revision in light 
of evidence.46 
Yet there is a different kind of case—pertaining not to the
underinclusiveness of the characterization but rather its overinclusiveness— 
that might raise doubts about whether categoricity of commands and 
insulation from evidence are distinctive features of religious belief and 
practice.  Think, for example, of the Maoist personality cult that gripped 
China during the “cultural revolution” in the 1960s.47  Here masses of 
individuals acted on commands from Chairman Mao that they took to 
be, in effect, “categorical” and that they carried out without regard to 
evidence, including evidence of the substantial harms inflicted on
individuals and, ultimately, society as a whole—though arguably evidence
of these latter harms was less apparent at the time.  Does this make the
Maoist personality cult a religion?  Perhaps we should so describe it, yet 
this seems to run roughshod over distinctions it seems worth drawing. 
Pre-theoretically, after all, we might think totalitarian personality cults
are distinct from religions, even if in some historical and cultural
contexts their nature and effects are the same.  But what marks the 
difference, given that it is not the categorical character of their commands
or the insulation of their core beliefs from evidence?  One plausible idea
is that religious beliefs not only involve categorical commands and 
insulation from evidence, but also: 
(3) Religious beliefs involve, explicitly or implicitly, a metaphysics 
of ultimate reality. 
But what is it to endorse a “metaphysics of ultimate reality”?  A 
metaphysics of an ultimate reality seems to be distinguished, in part, by 
the relationship in which it stands to the empirical evidence of the 
sciences: namely, that such a view about the “essence” or “ultimate nature”
of things neither claims support from empirical evidence, nor purports to
be constrained by empirical evidence—its claims “transcend” the
empirical evidence, hence its “metaphysical” character.  In this regard,
though, (3) seems to be only a variation on the idea that religious belief 
is insulated from evidence—“insulated” not only in the sense that it does 
46. It might be said, as Kenneth Himma pointed out to me, that religious beliefs 
are “in principle” revisable: if God thundered from the sky that Heaven and Hell do not 
exist, it might be supposed that this would, in fact, change the minds of some number of
religious believers.  But “in principle” responsiveness to a kind of evidence that is never
in the offing seems indistinguishable in practice from insulation from evidence, simpliciter. 
47. See, e.g., TAI SUNG AN, MAO TSE-TUNG’S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1972). 
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not answer to empirical evidence but also in the sense that it does not 
even aspire to answer to such evidence. 
The latter point may capture the metaphysical character of the beliefs,
but it is still silent on the sense in which they concern ultimate reality.  
“Ultimate” in this context has less to do, I think, with metaphysical
gradations of what is essential—whatever that would mean—than it does
with questions of value: the “ultimate” reality is the aspect of reality that 
is most important for valuable/worthwhile/desirable human lives, whether 
that concerns the transcendent well-being of the “soul” or the moral 
value of life in this, the material world.  The categoricity of commands
distinctive of religious beliefs are, in turn, related to this metaphysics of 
ultimate reality in the sense that they specify what must be done in order 
for believers to stand in the right kinds of relations to “ultimate reality,”
that is, to the reality that makes their lives worthwhile and meaningful.48 
Will the addition of a third distinctive characteristic of religious belief 
rule out personality cults of the Maoist variety?  There is some reason to 
think so.  First, the Maoist-style personality cults may ordinarily be de 
facto insulated from evidence, but they are less often de jure insulated:
that is, they purport to answer to facts and evidence, in a way that 
“metaphysical” claims about “ultimate” reality do not even purport to do 
so.49  Second, the personality cults, focused as they are on the personality of 
the leader, have an only indirect connection to the nature of ultimate 
reality, one contingent on the extent to which the “leader” is interested in
those kinds of questions.  To the extent a personality cult is de jure insulated 
from evidence and the “dear leader’s” commands are directly related to 
his view of ultimate reality, then to that extent we may need to revise the 
pre-theoretical intuition—if we share it—that personality cults are 
different from religious beliefs.
Although a metaphysics of ultimate reality may be the third essential 
feature that distinguishes religious belief from the beliefs held by
participants in personality cults, for purposes of our topic only the first 
two features matter.  This is because the second feature, insulation from 
evidence, especially de jure insulation from evidence, already captures 
48. In this sense, the as-if categorical reasons may really be instrumental ones.  See
supra note 36. 
49. So, for example, Mao thought forcing educated professionals to labor in the 
fields was an instrumentally rational approach to promoting the egalitarian values on 
which the communist revolution was based. 
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what is significant: namely, the metaphysical character of religious beliefs
about “ultimate reality.”  By contrast, so many different systems of
belief involve views about “ultimate reality”—and such views almost all 
qualify for toleration under the rubric of “conscience,” subject, of 
course, to the usual side-constraints—that the fact that religious beliefs 
also involve such views will not generate any special reason for toleration 
that does not attach in virtue of the first two distinctive features of
religious belief. 
This leaves us, then, with a final possible, and perhaps the most
worrisome, case of overinclusiveness in the proposed account of religion,
namely morality itself.  For is not morality characterized both by
categoricity of its commands and its insulation from reasons and
evidence, as reasons and evidence are understood in the sciences?  Now 
as noted earlier, categoricity is not necessarily a feature of morality, 
though it is, to be sure, central on many theoretical understandings, and 
religion, as we also observed earlier, may make categoricity socially 
effective in a way that it would not otherwise be.  But what of
“insulation from reasons and evidence”?  What we say about morality on 
this score will depend, ultimately, on what we take to be the relevant 
metaphysics and semantics of morality.  For cognitivist realists like 
Richard Boyd and Peter Railton,50 for example, moral judgments are not 
insulated from reasons and evidence as they are understood in the
sciences—indeed, just the opposite.51  So on this view, morality is not at
all like religion: it answers to reasons and evidence—and answers
successfully!  Noncognitivist antirealists, by contrast, conceive of moral
judgments not as expressing beliefs, which might be true or false, but 
rather as expressing mental states that are not truth-apt, that is, are by
their nature insulated from reasons and evidence.52  Religious judgments
are still different, on this account because some religious judgments do 
50. See, e.g., PETER RAILTON, FACTS, VALUES, AND NORMS: ESSAYS TOWARD A
MORALITY OF CONSEQUENCE (2003); Richard N. Boyd, How To Be a Moral Realist, in
ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 181 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
51. If one takes views like John McDowell’s to be instances of cognitivist realism,
then the issue is trickier, but I do not think views like McDowell’s are viable accounts of 
the objectivity of morality, for reasons discussed in BRIAN LEITER, Objectivity, Morality, 
and Adjudication, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 225, 225–55.  Of 
course, there is the more general problem that, with the professionalization of philosophy,
someone comes along to defend every possible position in logical space, no matter how 
ludicrous.  Naturalism cognitivist realism and noncognitivism strike me as the two most
serious contenders, both at present and historically, and so I focus on them here. 
52. Moral judgments, to be sure, may still be influenced by evidence, insofar as the 
attitudes expressed presuppose factual claims that answer to evidence. 
950
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express beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons and
evidence, but are held to be insulated from them.  So on either of the main
contenders for a credible metaphysics and semantics of morality, morality is
still different from religion. 
If, then, the categoricity of its commands and its insulation from 
evidence—not just de facto but also de jure—are the distinctive features
of religious belief—not, to be clear, the features that make religious 
beliefs important and meaningful to people, but rather the features that
distinguish religious beliefs from other equally important and meaningful 
beliefs—should we respect religious belief, in the “affirmative” sense 
noted earlier, or merely tolerate it? 
IV. CAN WE RESPECT RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE? 
So can we justify respect for religious conscience in some sense
stronger than the minimal kind of Recognition Respect discharged by
toleration?  I want to turn, again, to a contemporary philosopher who has
grappled with a version of our issue, namely, Simon Blackburn.53 
Blackburn tells the story of being invited to dinner at a colleague’s home 
and then being asked to participate in a religious observance prior to 
dinner.  Blackburn declined, though his colleague said participating was 
merely a matter of showing “respect.”  His host seems to have viewed
this as a matter of simple Recognition Respect, but Blackburn interpreted it,
perhaps rightly, as something more:
I would not be expected to respect the beliefs of flat-Earthers or those of the
people who believed that the Hale-Bopp comet was a recycling facility for dead
Californians and killed themselves in order to join it.  Had my host stood up and
asked me to toast the Hale-Bopp hopefuls, or to break bread or some such in 
token of fellowship with them, I would have been just as embarrassed and
indeed angry.  I lament and regret the holding of such beliefs, and I deplore the 
features of humanity that make them so common.  I wish people were different.54 
Blackburn’s reaction brings out starkly that Recognition Respect— 
which requires us to treat others as morality requires in virtue of some 
morally relevant attribute of theirs—does not entail that we view them as 
 53. Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in PHILOSOPHERS WITHOUT GODS:
MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 179 (Louise M. Antony ed., 2007). 
Blackburn’s account, it bears emphasizing, concerns an interpersonal context calling for
respect or toleration, rather than the context of institutional practices towards individuals.
54. Id. at 179. 
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Appraisal Respect might require.  Blackburn, himself, remarks that respect 
“is a tricky term” because it “seems to span a spectrum from simply not 
interfering, passing by on the other side, through admiration, right up to
reverence and deference.”55  He dubs as “respect creep” the phenomenon 
by which “the request for minimal toleration turns into a demand for 
more substantial respect, such as fellow-feeling, or esteem, and finally 
deference and reverence,” which is what his dinner host expected and
which Blackburn declined to offer.56 
But given the ambiguity of “respect”—marked by the continuum from 
“toleration” to “esteem” and “reverence”—what is it that should incline 
one to one end of the spectrum or the other?  Here Blackburn’s own 
account of his resistance to offering the Recognition Respect his host 
asked for is a bit unclear.  We can distinguish three considerations: 
(1) Religious belief is false belief.  The falsity of religious belief is 
clearly part of the reason Blackburn is resistant to offering it respect, but 
surely falsity is not enough.  After all, if his host had asked that Blackburn 
raise his glass in a toast to “my beautiful and intelligent children,” surely
Blackburn would have raised his glass even if the offspring were homely
and dull witted.  We are, all of us, in the grips of a multitude of false 
beliefs—I believe you are enjoying this paper, you believe your 
colleagues think well of you, she thinks her research breaks new ground, 
he believes he is a clever conversationalist—but these usually do not 
elicit disrespect, contempt, or ridicule from our peers.  Indeed, one might 
well admire, for example, my confidence and her enthusiasm for her 
research.  So the falsity of belief is plainly not enough to explain why
there is a special problem about respect for religion.
(2) Religious belief is perniciously false belief.  This consideration, I 
suspect, comes closer to the mark for someone like Blackburn: it is not 
just that his host has false beliefs—though Blackburn’s rhetoric could 
suggest that is the issue—but that he has false beliefs whose falsity is 
pernicious.  False beliefs can be pernicious in various ways, for
example, in how they affect the believer’s behavior or to the extent they 
are part of an institutional web of false beliefs whose consequences are 
pernicious—licensing, harassment of and discrimination against gay
men and women, attacks on science education in the schools, and 
opposition to valuable scientific research in a variety of areas.  If 
Blackburn’s host had said, “And now let us bow our heads in honor of
my personal hero, Adolf Hitler, a great and honest man who led the fight
55. Id. at 180. 
56. Id.
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against the poisonous influence of world Jewry,” one might easily
understand Blackburn’s refusal of Recognition, let alone Appraisal, 
Respect: his host has a perniciously false belief.  And if Blackburn were 
attending dinner with his host in North Carolina, one of his academic
homes, in 1959, and the host had asked everyone to raise a glass “in
salute to the brave leaders of the White Citizens’ Council who strive to 
keep the Negro in the position to which his intellectual and moral character
suits him,” we can easily—at least today—understand why Blackburn 
would refuse because the beliefs expressed are not only perniciously 
false but part of an institutional structure that caused immeasurable harm
to human beings. 
But these are not the dinners Blackburn attended.  So our real question 
is whether there is any reason to think that a Jewish prayer before Friday
evening dinner—what was at issue in Blackburn’s case—is a case of 
comparably pernicious false belief in either sense.  More generally, is
there any reason to think religious belief per se is comparably pernicious? 
(3) Religious belief is culpably false belief, that is, it is unwarranted
and one ought to know it is unwarranted.  This is probably the real 
concern for Blackburn, and it certainly distinguishes the case of religious 
belief from some of our other false beliefs, such as those involving our 
children or ourselves.57  Why should culpably false beliefs elicit respect, 
rather than indulgence or toleration?  That is surely the point of Blackburn’s 
scenarios such as being asked to “respect” those who believe the Hale-
Bopp comet is a recycling facility for dead Californians.  These beliefs 
are false, and ridiculously so, and no one in his or her right mind should
accept them.
But are religious beliefs—say, belief in the resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, or in the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, nonmaterial
being—such beliefs?  They differ from the Hale-Bopp beliefs in several
obvious respects: they have more adherents, are more familiar to
nonbelievers, and are more deeply integrated into the cultural and 
normative practices of our society, even among the normative practices 
of those who do not accept the beliefs in question.58  Is that enough to
57. Blackburn’s host may falsely believe his children are intelligent and attractive, 
but he is hardly epistemically blameworthy for so believing!
58. Recall Nietzsche’s quip about putative “free thinkers” who say, “We loathe the 
Church, not its poison [that is, its moral teaching] . . . Apart from the Church, we too 
love the poison . . . .”  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morality, in ON THE
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think they warrant respect in some sense more affirmative than mere 
toleration? 
One might suppose, for all kinds of practical (for example, Hobbesian)
reasons, that the category of widely accepted culpable false belief deserves
different treatment than the category of idiosyncratic culpable false 
belief, though it is hard to see why that would add up to anything like the 
affirmative kind of Appraisal Respect that Blackburn’s host expected or 
Nussbaum’s “precious faculty” account would suggest.  So perhaps our 
focus should not be on the quantity of culpable false belief involved but
on its culpability, which seems to be the relevant factor.  After all, if I 
believe that I am Zeus and you are a mere mortal and so should not be so
insolent as to ask me hard questions about the paper, then I have a 
culpably false belief, which does not warrant affirmative respect (and 
probably not even tolerance!). 
Is our religious believer in the same situation?  Certainly any answer 
depends, in the first instance, on the available evidence and thus the 
standards for what would constitute blameworthy epistemic irresponsibility.59 
In the fourteenth century, religious belief was quite plainly neither 
irrational nor unwarranted—and thus not culpably false belief—but after 
the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, it is less clear.  Of 
course, there is a large literature in Anglophone philosophy devoted to 
defending the rationality of religious belief.60  I shall not, here, be able to 
address this literature in any detail.  Suffice it to observe that its proponents
are uniformly religious believers and that much of it has the unpleasant
appearance of post hoc, sometimes desperately post hoc, rationalization.
Alex Byrne, a philosopher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), captures the dominant sentiment among other philosophers about 
this literature rather well:
[I]t is fair to say that the arguments [for God’s existence] have left the philosophical
community underwhelmed.  The classic contemporary work is J.L. Mackie’s
The Miracle of Theism, whose ironic title summarizes Mackie’s conclusion: the
GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 1, 21 (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., 1994)
(ellipses in original).
59. It also depends on whether there are excusing conditions for the epistemically 
culpable false belief.  Sometimes the costs of giving up false beliefs that are widely 
accepted in one’s family or community, for example, are intolerably severe, such that
someone holding such beliefs may be epistemically culpable but excused nonetheless.
Religious beliefs may often be such beliefs, but it hardly follows that that kind of excusing
condition would rescue them for Appraisal Respect.
60. For a recent example, see ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRISTIAN BELIEF
(2000). 
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persistence of belief in God is a kind of miracle because it is so unsupported by
reason and evidence.61 
Of course, our prior account of what makes a matter of conscience religious 
did not include any reference to theism but rather to the categoricity of 
at least some religious commands and the fact that some religious beliefs
are insulated from evidence, as evidence is understood in common sense 
and the sciences.62  The so-called reformed epistemology of apologists
for religious belief like William Alston and Alvin Plantinga is, thus,
predicated on an attack on “Enlightenment-approved evidence.”63 
I am going to assume—uncontroversially among most philosophers 
but controversially among reformed epistemologists—that “reformed
epistemology” is nothing more than an effort to insulate religious faith 
from ordinary standards of reasons and evidence in common sense and
the sciences, and thus religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted 
belief given those ordinary epistemic standards.  Even allowing that that 
is true, does it follow that such beliefs do not warrant a more affirmative 
kind of respect than mere Recognition Respect, which could be discharged
by toleration? 
To think there is a problem here, we do need to assume that culpable 
failure of epistemic warrant is a reason to withhold Appraisal Respect 
from a belief.  Is that true?  Often when we admire someone’s loyalty or 
devotion to a cause or a person, we admire his or her willingness to
remain committed to it notwithstanding countervailing evidence.  She 
thinks her son is a wonderful pianist, even though his piano teacher would
sooner take gas than give the boy another futile lesson.  He continued to 
support Senator McCarthy’s presidential bid in 1968, even after it was 
clear one of the hawkish candidates would get the nomination.  The 
mother and the supporter ought to know better as a purely epistemic 
matter, but there is something admirable about their stances.  In these 
cases, though, we think the loyalty or devotion has some value either to 
the person or the cause so valued, or that it exemplifies a trait of
character or habit of mind that is otherwise valuable. 
 61. Alex Byrne, God, BOS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2009, available at http://www.boston
review.net/BR34.1/byrne.php. 
62. The latter insulation is, to be sure, central to what makes theism possible, as
Mackie argues.
63. I borrow the phrase from Peter Forrest’s generally sympathetic account in 
Peter Forrest, The Epistemology of Religion, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar.
11, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-epistemology. 
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Let us suppose, as seems most plausible, that religious belief in the 
post-Enlightenment era involves culpable failures of epistemic warrant. 
Can it be redeemed by the kinds of considerations just noted?  This, it
seems to me, is the central and hard question about whether the law of 
religious liberty should embody mere toleration or a more affirmative 
kind of Appraisal Respect.  Do matters of conscience that issue in
categorical demands on action and that are insulated from reasons and 
evidence have a special kind of value that we should appraise highly or 
merely tolerate? 
It might be tempting in the United States in the early twenty-first
century to think the answer obvious.  After all—to take an example close 
to home—religious believers overwhelmingly supported George W. 
Bush, one of the worst Presidents in the history of the United States and
a moral monster without peer among leaders of purportedly civilized 
countries, during his reign of criminal military aggressions and domestic
mismanagement.  Of course, if we really thought there were some
connection between religious belief and support for the likes of George 
W. Bush, then even toleration would not be a reasonable moral attitude 
to adopt towards religion: after all, practices of toleration are, themselves, 
answerable to the Millian “harm principle,” and there would be no reason 
ex ante to think that Bush’s human carnage is something one should
tolerate. 
But such a posture is not warranted: there is no reason to think that 
beliefs unhinged from reasons and evidence and that issue in categorical 
demands on action are especially likely to issue in “harm” to others.  As
we noted earlier, there are plenty of cases—resistance to Nazism, or
opposition to apartheid—where religious believers pursued what now 
seems the obviously morally correct course long before others.  On the
other side, take the au courant case of Bernard Madoff, who swindled 
thousands of individuals out of billions of dollars by promising unrealistic 
returns on purported “investments.”  Although Madoff exploited his 
religious connections, to be sure, it is quite clear that he himself was 
acting on the basis of hypothetical imperatives—where the consequent 
of each conditional was his own enrichment—that were keenly attuned 
to reasons and evidence: he was clearly an astute student of the facts
about human psychology!  Perhaps beliefs that issue in categorical demands 
on action and that are unhinged from reasons and evidence are more
harmful, on average, but it seems to me much more empirical evidence
would actually be required to support that conclusion. 
956
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Do we really need such evidence, though, to answer our initial question? 
The default position, as I have argued elsewhere,64 is that we ought to
tolerate—show Recognition Respect—towards religious beliefs, but do 
we have any reason to accord them a more affirmative form of respect,
for example, Darwall’s Appraisal Respect?  That is the central issue
here.  And it is now difficult to see how any of the preceding considerations
would support the conclusion that religious matters of conscience warrant
esteem or reverence.  Only if there were a positive correlation between
beliefs that were culpably without epistemic warrant and valuable outcomes 
would it seem that we should think them proper objects of Appraisal
Respect.  But the evidence on this score is, to put it mildly, mixed.65 
V. CONCLUDING (TENTATIVE) THOUGHTS
So where does that conclusion leave us with regard to the law of 
religious liberty?  Legal regimes regarding religious practices usually
provide for exemptions from laws that burden religious practice and
prohibit governments from “establishing” one form of religious practice.
Good governments, of course, have a variety of moral obligations, but
one of those is obviously to tolerate those practices that are morally
deserving of tolerance.  That obligation might seem to warrant a “free
exercise” regime, including exemptions from generally applicable laws 
 64. Leiter, supra note 4. 
65. Perhaps the argument for Appraisal Respect for religious beliefs and practices 
could be redeemed by the following argument.  (Here I am indebted to Peter Railton.) 
Think of the National Science Foundation (NSF) or the National Endowment for the 
Humanities.  Most of the work these institutions fund turns out to be of little or no value 
to anyone, other than the grant recipient.  Some of it is positively dreadful or, in retrospect,
foolish.  Yet we might have reason to appraise these institutions highly because they do 
make possible some research of great value by anyone’s estimation.  Because we have 
conceded, already, that religious commitment, with its distinctive commitment to categoricity
and indifference to reasons and evidence, is in fact conducive to distinctively good outcomes 
in certain circumstances—resistance to fascists and racists—might we not have analogous 
reasons to appraise highly religion?  To be sure, it often leads to horrors and abominations, but 
it also yields “moral gems.”  If this argument is to be persuasive, however, everything turns
(again) on questions of degree: does religious belief and practice yield valuable 
outcomes often enough relative to the bad outcomes it yields?  If the NSF mostly funded
work in alchemy, Intelligent Design, and Lamarckianism, while occasionally footing the
bill for genuinely cutting edge research in chemistry or biology, we would not highly
appraise the institution but instead think its existence barely justified given the track 
record.   The track record on religion is, quite obviously mixed, sufficiently mixed, that it 
is hard to see the kinds of considerations noted above supporting the attitude of
Appraisal Respect. 
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for actions demanded by conscience. Because, however, there is no reason 
to limit claims of conscience to claims of religious conscience, the issue
becomes considerably more complicated.66  Exemptions from generally 
applicable laws for all claims of conscience promise both insuperable 
epistemic problems for adjudicative bodies—which must figure out 
which claims are claims of conscience and which are not, and without
reliance on proxies like participation in religious rituals—and enormous
burdens on the rest of society as exemption claims multiply.67  Eliminating 
exemptions, however, would, as Nussbaum notes, impose a burden on 
matters of minority conscience because, for obvious reasons, societies 
will not create legal prohibitions that burden widespread demands of 
conscience.68 
A strong antiestablishment principle, along the lines of French laïcité, 
would only be a partial barrier to the latter problem, which arises not 
simply from government efforts to promote particular religions but from 
the way in which the other regulatory actions of government will be 
insensitive to infringements upon matters of minority conscience.  Perhaps 
such a burden, however, is the price of not treating religious conscience 
as special, when no principled argument could support that practice. 
We can now see, too, the import of deciding whether the moral
foundation of liberty of conscience is toleration (minimal respect) or 
something more affirmative, like Appraisal Respect.  Those practices
that are proper objectives of Appraisal Respect often do command
exemptions from generally applicable laws.  Think of the tax-exempt
status of charitable—including religious—organizations in American law. 
Because society highly appraises charitable activities, they are exempt
from the general rules pertaining to taxation.69  More generally, we might
think that attitude and practices that warrant Appraisal Respect ought to 
command governmental solicitude and support, as opposed to “mere” 
toleration.  If claims of conscience were all proper objects of Appraisal
Respect—a thesis rejected earlier70—then a broad claim for exemptions
would have more force than it does.  But if the only claim of conscience
66. The conclusion of Leiter, supra note 4, but one accepted also by NUSSBAUM, 
supra note 6.
67. It would also be tantamount to a “constitutional . . . right to civil disobedience,” if I
may borrow Michael White’s apt characterization. Michael J. White, The First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses: “Freedom of Conscience” Versus Institutional Accommodation, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2010). 
 68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 125. 
69. A legal posture that has obvious ideological benefits in a system predicated on 
greed.
70. Supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
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is for toleration, then it is not obvious why the state should subordinate 
its other morally important objectives—safety, health, well-being—to 
claims of conscience, religious or otherwise. 
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